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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Despite Respondent's allegation that the appropriate standard
of review

in this case

is the

"substantial

evidence" test,

Petitioner's challenge is not to the facts but rather to legal
issues.

The primary issue in this case is the application of the

so-called "odd-lot" doctrine and that issue is one of law, which is
to be reviewed under the "correction of error" standard without any
deference to the agency's view of the law being required.

Utah

Administrative procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b16(4) (d) (1988).

Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d

328 (Utah 1991).

Morton Int'l., Inc. v. Auditing Division of the

Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Utah

Code

Annotated,

Section

35-1-67

(1971)

is

the

determinative statute in this case. It is set forth in full in the
Addendum hereto as Exhibit A.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The primary issue on appeal is Mr. Jackson's entitlement to
workers' compensation benefits under the "odd-lot" doctrine. As a
result of an industrial injury, Mr. Jackson is no longer able to be
employed in any well-known branch of the labor market. Although he
undeniably had other medical problems, the industrial injury was
the "straw which broke the camels back." Following his industrial
injury he was unable to perform any meaningful work.

1

Due to

advanced age, limited education and other health problems he was
not a suitable candidate for vocational rehabilitation.
classic "odd-lot" doctrine case.

He is a

Respondents have misconstrued

Petitioner's Social Security file which is replete with references
to his back on a sourse of his disability.
Respondents fail to meaningfully address the application of
the "odd-lot" doctrine to the facts of this case. The vast bulk of
the arguments in Respondent's Brief become totally irrelevent and
immaterial once the "odd-lot" doctrine is applied.

This Court

should summarily reverse the Industrial Commission's final agency
action by ruling that Mr. Jackson was entitled to the presumption
afforded by the "odd lot" doctrine, and it was not rebutted as a
matter of law in this case.

ARGUMENT IN REPLY
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO APPLY THE "ODD LOT"
DOCTRINE TO PETITIONER'S PERMANENT, TOTAL DISABILITY
CLAIM, AND SUCH APPLICATION RESULTS IN A PRESUMPTION OF
ENTITLEMENT WHICH HAS NOT BEEN REBUTTED,
In his original Brief, Petitioner argued that he was entitled
to

permanent, total disability

benefits

under

the "odd-lot"

doctrine.

This argument was made before the Administrative Law

Judge

the

and

Industrial

Commission

entitlement was never rebutted.

and

the presumption

of

Respondents on appeal have also

largely ignored this primary and compelling basis for an award of
benefits.

2

In order to fully appreciate the application of the "odd-lot
doctrine it is helpful to understand it's development and the
factual context to which it has been applied.
A.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE "ODD-LOT" DOCTRINE.

Perhaps the first case to discuss the concept of the "odd-lot11
doctrine was the English case of Cardiff Corporation v. Hall, 1 KB
1009 (1911):
There are cases in which the burden of shewing suitable
work can in fact be obtained does fall up the employer.
[If]...the capacities for work left to him fit him only
for special uses and do not .. . make his powers of labour
a merchantable article in some well known lines of the
labor market....[I]t is incumbent upon the employer to
shew that such special employment can in fact be obtained
by him...flf1 the accident leaves the workman's labour in
the position of an "odd-lot" in the labor market, the
employer must shew that a customer can be found who will
take it.... (Emphasis added).
Judge

Cordozo

very

early

in

the

history

of

workmen's

compensation in the United States, set the policy for odd-lot
determination:
He was an unskilled or common laborer. He coupled his
request for employment with notice that labor must be
light. The applicant imposing such conditions is quickly
put aside for more versatile competitors. Business has
little patience with the suitor for ease and favor. He
is the ' odd-lot' man, the nondescript in the labor
market. Work, if he gets it, is likely to be casual and
intermittent...Rebuff, if suffered, might reasonably be
ascribed to the narrow opportunities that await the sick
and halt. Jordan v. Decorative Co., 130 N.E. 635, 636
(N.Y. App. 1921). (Emphasis added).
Professor Larson in his oft cited treatise on workmen7s
compensation law describes this doctrine, as follows:
Under the odd-lot doctrine, which is accepted in
virtually every jurisdiction, total disability may be
found in the case of workers who, while not altogether
incapacitated for work, are so handicapped that they will
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not be employed regularly in any well-known branch of the
labor market. The essence of the test is the probable
dependability with which claimant can sell his services
in a competitive labor market, undistorted by such
factors as business booms, sympathy of a particular
employer or fiends, temporary good luck, or the
superhuman efforts of the claimant to rise above his
crippling handicaps. 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's
Compensation, § 57.51 at 10-164.24 (1992). (footnotes
omitted). (Emphasis added).
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE IN UTAH.
The "odd-lot" doctrine has been accepted and favorably applied
by the Utah Courts.

One of the first modern Utah cases applying

the doctrine was Brundage v. IML Freight, Inc., 622 P.2d 790 (Utah
1980) were the injured worker had spent thirty years as a truck
driver. In August of 1975, he injured his back in a non-industrial
accident which led to surgery later that year.

In October, 1916,

he had recovered sufficiently to return to his job as a truck
driver. He subsequently reinjured his back in the course and scope
of his employment and in 1977 again underwent surgery on his back.
Several months later, however, he re-injured his back in another
non-industrial accident and was thereafter unable to return to
work.
The Industrial Commission found Mr. Brundage suffered from a
30% permanent partial impairment, half of which was attributable to
the industrial injury, and half of which was attributable to
nonindustrial causes. Mr. Brundage was awarded permanent partial
impairment benefits, but his claim for permanent total disability
was denied.
In reversing the Industrial Commissions' ruling regarding
permanent total disability, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
4

In his treatise, The Law of Workmen's Compensation,
Professor Arthur Larson states:
'total disability' in compensation law is not
to be interpreted literally as utter and
abject helplessness.,.. The task is to phrase
a rule delimiting the amount and character of
work a [person] can be able to do without
forfeiting his totally disabled status.
2
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, §
57.51 at 10-107 (1992).
Consonant with the view expressed by Larson, the
Supreme Court has adopted the following definition of
total disability:
This Court has recognized the principle that a
workman may be found totally disabled if by
reason of the disability resulting from his
injury he cannot perform work of the general
character he was performing when injured, or
any other work which a \person1 of his
capabilities may be able to do or to learn to
do. . . .
United Park City Mines Co. v.
Prescott, 393 P.2d 800, 801-802 (1964).
(Emphasis added).
The next important decision was Entwistle v. Wilkins, 626 P.2d
495 (Utah 1981) . Mr. Wilkins, who was 55 years old, at the time of
his

industrial

injury,

sold

trailers

and

other

types

of

recreational vehicles which required him to travel throughout the
west contacting dealers. In 1977 he suffered an industrial injury
to his back while on a business trip when he slipped and struck his
back on some large rocks while attempting to unhitch a trailer. He
was off work for some time while undergoing physical therapy, and
although he later returned to light duty, he was eventually unable
to continue

because

of pain.

In defining

the term

"total

disability" the Court stated as follows:
...'total disability7 does not mean a state of abject
helplessness or that the injured employee must be unable
to do any work at all. The fact that an injured employee
5

may be able to do some kinds of tasks to earn occasional
wages does not necessarily preclude a finding of total
disability to perform the work or follow the occupation
in which he was injured. His temporary disability may be
found to be total if he can no longer perform the duties
of the character required in his occupation prior to his
injury.
Id at 498.
(citations omitted).
(Emphasis
added).
The "odd-lot" doctrine was next considered in the monumental
case of Marshall v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 681 P. 2d 208
(Utah 1984). The Applicant was employed by Emery Mining Company as
a maintenance mechanic in a coal mine.

While leaving the mine in

the back of a tractor-trailer, he was bounced up and down on the
seat causing an injury to his back.

After several months of

conservative medical treatment, Mr. Marshall underwent surgery.
Following surgery he was advised by his doctor that he could not
return to work.

Mr. Marshall was 67 years of age at the time.

The Industrial Commission awarded Mr. Marshall permanent
partial impairment compensation finding he sustained a 10% whole
body permanent, partial impairment due to the industrial accident
and 15% due to pre-existing conditions.

However, the Commission

refused his request for permanent total disability stating the
primary reason he was unable to return to work was his age.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the Industrial Commission
ruling that Mr. Marshall was entitled to permanent total disability
benefits under the "odd-lot" doctrine.
The Court defined permanent total disability as follows:
[A] workman may be found totally disabled if by reason of
the disability resulting from his injury he cannot
perform work of the general character he was performing
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when injured, or any other work which a man of his
capabilities may be able to do or to learn to do....681
P.2d at 211. (Emphasis added).
The Court further stated:
Disability is evaluated not in the abstract, but in terms
of the specific individual who has suffered a workrelated injury. An injury to a hand would not cause the
same degree of disability in a teacher, for example, as
it would in an electrician. Thus, in assessing the loss
of earning capacity, a constellation of factors must be
considered, only one of which is the physical impairment.
Other factors are age, education, training and mental
capacity.
It is the unique configuration of these
factors that together will determine the impact of the
impairment on the individuals earning capacity. Id. at
211. (citations omitted).
Some employees, however, cannot be rehabilitated and
even though not in a state of abject helplessness ' can
no longer perform the duties . . . required in [their]
occupation[s].' These employees fall into the so-called
'odd-lot' category... Whether or not an employee falls
into the odd-lot category depends on whether there is
regular, dependable work available for the employee who
does not rely on the sympathy of friends or his own super
human efforts. Once the employee has presented evidence
that he can no longer perform the duties required in his
occupation and that he cannot be rehabilitated, the
burden shifts to the employer to prove the existence of
regular, steady work that the employee can perform,
taking into account the employee's education, mental
capacity and age.... 'It is much easier for the
[employer] to prove the employability of the [employee]
for a particular job than for the [employee] to try to
prove the universal negative of not being employable at
any work.' Id at 212-213. (Citations omitted). (Emphasis
added).
Finally, the Court pointed out that the majority of odd-lot
cases are concerned with employees whose work involved physical
labor, were 50 years of age and older, and had moderate or little
education, similar to the Petitioner herein.

Id. at 212.

In Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725 P.2d 1323
(Utah 1986) , the Plaintiff, who was sixty years old with a limited
7

education and even more

limited work background,

suffered a

fractured skull when a steel beam fell and stuck him on the head.
A Medical Panel found that he had a 25% whole body permanent,
partial impairment, with 15% being related to the industrial injury
and 10% being related to pre-existing conditions.

He requested

permanent, total disability benefits based on his overall physical
impairment, as well as his age and lack of education and skills.
Despite

the

request, the

Industrial

Commission

awarded

only

permanent, partial impairment compensation.
In finding that the Plaintiff had presented a prima facie case
of permanent, total disability, the Court stated, as follows:
The Commissions findings failed to acknowledge the oddlot doctrine accepted in most jurisdictions and which has
been repeatedly approved by this Court. That doctrine
recognized the substantial difference between physical
impairment and disability. For example, a low percentage
of physical impairment is not per se less than total
permanent disability. Numerous other courts applying the
odd-lot doctrine have found permanent total disability
despite a deceptively low percentage of physical
impairment.... The odd lot doctrine further requires an
evaluation of disability in terms of the specific
individual who has suffered work-related injury....
Absent proof of employment reasonably available to one in
the odd-lot category, the injured employee should be
classified as totally disabled. Id. at 1326-1327.
(Citations omitted). (Emphasis added).
In Norton v. Industrial Commission. 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986),
decided

shortly

after

the

Hardman

case,

the

Supreme

Court

reiterated it's holding in Hardman, and stated as follows:
As in Hardman,... the Commission again failed in this
case to carry out its tasks. It adopted with slight
modification the findings of impairment reported by the
medical panel but then failed in its administrative
responsibility and function to evaluate Norton's
< permanent disability which should have included such
factors as Norton's 'present and future ability to engage
8

in gainful activity' as it is affected by such diverse
factors as age, sex, education, economic and social
environment, in addition to the definite medical factorpermanent impairment. Id. at 1027.
* * *

Upon remand the Commission is required to address
Norton's disability in light of all factors mentioned
ante, and the burden will be on the employer to prove the
existence of regular, steady work that Norton could
perform, taking into account his age, limited education
and functional illiteracy as well as his disabling pain.
Id. at 1028. (Emphasis added).
In Peck v. Eimco Process Equipment Co. , 748 P. 2d 572 (Utah
1987) , the injured worker was employed as an industrial maintenance
mechanic for the defendant.

He suffered two industrial injuries

which together resulted in a permanent partial impairment of 12% on
a whole body basis.

Following surgery, he returned to work with

light duty restrictions. He retired approximately one year latter
at age 65 and at that time requested that he be awarded permanent,
total disability compensation.
Judge

approved

permanent

Although the Administrative Law

total

compensation,

the

Industrial

Commission reversed.
The Utah Supreme Court overruled the Industrial Commissions
decision and reinstated the Administrative Law Judged ruling,
citing approvingly the Norton, Marshall and Hardman decisions.
Finally, in the recent case of Zimmermann v. Industrial
Commission, 785 P.2d 1127, (Utah App. 1989) the Court reinterred
that:
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the 'odd lot doctrine'
which allows the Commission to find permanent total
disability when a relatively small percentage of

a

impairment caused by an industrial accident is combined
with other factors to render the claimant unable to
obtain employment. Id. at 1131. (citations omitted).
* * *

Hardman sets forth the following steps for
qualification under the 'odd-lot' doctrine:
(1) the employee must prove that he or she can
no longer perform the duties required in his
or her occupation; (2) the employee, having
been referred to the Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation by the Industrial Commission,
must, through cooperation with the Division,
establish
that
he
or
she
cannot
be
rehabilitated; and (3) the burden then shifts
to the employer to prove the existence of
steady work the employee can perform, taking
into account several factors, including the
employee's education, mental capacity, and
age. Id. at 1131. (citations omitted).
(emphasis added).
C.

APPLICATION OP PACTS TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE ODD-LOT

DOCTRINE.
As initially stated in Hardman and clarified in Zimmermann
there are three steps required for the application of the odd-lot
doctrine: (1) the employee must prove that he can no longer perform
the duties required in his or her occupation; (2) the employee must
prove that he cannot be rehabilitated; and (3) the employer then
has the burden to prove the existence of regular, steady work the
employee can perform.

If the employer can not do so, the injured

worker is entitled to permanent, total disability compensation as
an "odd-lot" injured worker.
A review of each of those elements discloses that they are all
satisfied in this case.
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1.

Inability to perform the duties required in his

occupation.
Both the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial
Commission spend a lot of time attempting to prove that it was Mr.
Jackson's pulmonary condition which prevented his return to work;
however,

for

the purpose

of

the

"odd-lot" doctrine

medical

causation is irrelevant. The only relevant issue at this stage is
whether Mr. Jackson could continue to perform the type of work that
he was performing prior to being injured.

None of the parties

seriously argue that Mr. Jackson can return to work
underground coal mines.

in the

At the time of the Administrative Law

Judges decision Mr. Jackson was a 74 year old man who had not
worked in nineteen years.

(R. at 40).

Mr. Jackson did in fact attempt to return to work several
times in the year following his industrial injury, but was unable
to work more than three or four weeks at a time which precipitated
his work termination by his employer.

He estimated that he only

worked about 4-1/2 months after his accident which is certainly not
a successful return to work.

(R. at 40) . Mr. Jackson stated that

pain in his back and legs made working in "low coal" difficult.
(R. at 40) . The Utah Supreme Court in Norton, supra. held as
follows:
Provided that worker's disability was also analyzed with
the framework of the odd-lot doctrine, case law dealing
with the factor of substantial pain has general held that
'[a] worker who cannot return to any gainful employment
without suffering substantial pain is entitled to
compensation benefits for total disability.' (citations
omitted).
11

Mr, Jackson further testified that Dr. Smoot had "totaled him
out" and rendered him permanently unable to work.
That testimony was uncontroverted.

(R. at 40) .

The Administrative Law Judge

found that he had not worked for 19 years.

(R. at 41) . It is

undisputed that Mr. Jackson never returned to work, and applied,
the month after his work termination, for Social Security total
disability

benefits.

His

Social

Security

disability

award

determined that he had been unable to work as of April 24, 1973,
the date he last worked following his sporadic work history after
his 1972 industrial injury.
2.

(R. at 216-220).

INABILITY TO BE REHABILITATED.

Due to the Industrial Commissions finding that Mr. Jackson
had

failed to establish the necessary

causation between his

impairment and his industrial accident, a rehabilitation evaluation
was not ordered.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that in

light of his health, age and education that Mr. Jackson could be
rehabilitated.
Mr.

Jackson's

Order

granting

Social

Security

disability

benefits in 1982 made the following relevant findings:
5.

The claimant cannot perform his past relevant semiskilled work as a cutting machine operator and as a
roof bolter.

6.

The claimant is of advanced age, with a limited
education with no readily transferable skills.

7.

Based on his maximum sustained work capability,
age, education and work experience, the claimant
continues to be disabled. (R. at 220).

The evidence is clear and overwhelming that following his
industrial injury Mr. Jackson could not be rehabilitated for
12

meaningful and sustained employment.
3.

EXISTENCE OF REGULAR, STEADY WORK THE EMPLOYEE CAN

PERFORM.
Once the injured worker has satisfied elements (1) and (2)
above, the burden then shifts to the employer to prove the
existence of steady work the employee can perform, taking into
account several factors, including the employee's education, mental
capacity, and age. Hardman, at 1327. The Respondent employer has
not made even a pretence of making such a showing.

This failure

undoubtedly resulted from the fact that in this case such a burden
simply could not be met. Given Mr. Jackson's advanced age, severe
health problems and limited education, there is simply no steady
work he can now perform.
Therefore, Mr. Jackson has established his entitlement to
permanent, total disability as an "odd lot" injured worker.

The

presumption inherent in that doctrine has not been rebutted as a
matter of law and an appropriate award of benefits should be
issued.

CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the
Industrial Commission erred when it entered its November 3, 1992
Order

dismissing

Mr.

Jackson's

claim

for

permanent,

total

disability benefits for lack of medical causation. Mr. Jackson is
entitled to benefits under the "odd-lot" doctrine.

13

Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court remand
this case to the Industrial Commission with instructions to award
him

permanent,

total

disability

benefits

based

uncontroverted facts and medical evidence presented,
DATED this 28th day of May, 1993
D;
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on

the
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT A;

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1971).

35-1-67. Permanent total disability benefits—Vocational rehabilitation
—Maximum benefit.
In cases of permanent total disability the award shall be 60% of the
average weekly wages for five years from date of injury, and thereafter
45% of such average weekly wages, but not to exceed a maximum of $54
per week and not less than $29 per week, plus $5 for a dependent wife
and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children; provided, however, that
in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insurance
carrier be required to pay more than $24,648; and provided further, that
a finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all
cases be tentative and not final until such time as the following proceedings have been had:
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and
totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of
Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation
under the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall
be the duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68,
not to exceed $890 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such employee; the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally
follow the practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If and when the
division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education
certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing that such employee has fully co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilitation
in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the
employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order that
there be paid to such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 45% of
his average weekly earnings, but not to exceed $54 per week, out of that
special fund provided for by section 35-1-68, for such period of time beginning with the time that the payments (as in this section provided)
to be made by the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of the employee. No employee, however, shall be entitled to any such payments if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the
division of vocational rehabilitation as set forth herein.
Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally
disabled and now receiving compensation benefits from the special fund
provided for by section 35-1-68 shall be paid compensation benefits at
the rate of $44 per week. This section shall apply to all persons permanently and totally disabled who are now receiving or hereafter become
entitled to receive compensation benefits from the special fund.
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding
such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function.
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according
to the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent
total disability shall be required in such instances; in all other cases,
however, and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where
there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent disability.
In no case shall the employer be required to pay compensation for any
combination of disabilities of any kind including loss of function, in
excess of $24,648.

